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Abstract 
Several studies indicate the importance that the sequence of loss of residual heat removal system (RHRS) at midloop operation has in 
the global risk of the plant. In this sense, several simulations of loss of the RHRS with closed and open primary system with the TRACE 
V4.160 code have been performed considering different availability of steam generators. This paper aims to analyze not only the thermal-
hydraulic behavior of the plant after the loss of RHRS, but also the interaction of the simulation results with the abnormal operation 
procedures and with the event trees of the sequences of loss of RHRS at midloop operation. The simulation results show that the main 
parameters depends on primary vent and the number of steam generators available. After a detailed study of phenomenology and abnor-
mal procedures some modifications have been proposed in these procedures. 
1. Introduction 
After a loss of RHRS at midloop level, other cooling 
mechanisms are required in order to avoid fuel damage 
or mitigate the severity of the accident. These mechanisms 
could be feed and bleed and reflux-condensation, in which 
the steam goes into the steam generators tubes, where it 
eventually condenses and drains back to the hot leg. The 
efficiency of these mechanisms depends on the configura-
tion of the plant (open or closed primary system), the num-
ber of steam generators available and the residual heat 
level, Queral et al. (2006a) and Queral et al. (2006b). 
During shutdown condition there are several possible 
vent configurations available, Fig. 1: 
• no vent, primary closed, 
• pressurizer manway open (PMO), 
• one or two PORV open with relief tank dry and closed, 
• one or two PORV open with relief tank dry and open to 
containment, 
• one safety valve removed, 
• vessel vent valve open, and 
• any of the previous configurations with steam generator 
manways open (SMO) with two, four or six nozzle dams 
installed. 
Regarding the PORV vents, it is usual that the plants 
operate with the relief tank dry and closed during midloop 
conditions. This implies that the configuration of the plant 
continues closed despite of the PORVs opening. 
In this paper, the results of several simulations per-
formed for different configurations are described; closed 
and open scenarios (one and two PORV open, pressurizer 
manway open and vessel vent valve open) and different 
availability of steam generators. The simulations have been 
performed with the TRACE (TRAC/RELAP advanced 
computational engine, NRC, 2003) model of Almaraz 
NPP (3 loop, Westinghouse design). It has been taken into 
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Fig. 1. Primary openings and nozzle dams position. 
account the configurations of several plants. Thus, these 
analysis could be applied for a wide range of PWR-W 
(pressurized water reactor, Westinghouse design). In a sec-
ond stage, the results of these simulations have been 
applied to the analysis of several abnormal procedures that 
correspond to different nuclear power plants. These analy-
sis also include the event tree corresponding to the loss of 
RHRS at midlooop conditions. This paper expands the 
work that was shown in a previous paper, Queral et al. 
(2006b), with a wider scope results (more plant configura-
tions, such as primary closed, 2 PZR PORVs open, PZR 
Table 1 
Typical size of the primary vents in a generic Westinghouse plant 
Vent 
SG manway 
PZR manway 
PZR relief valves (2) 
PZR safety valves (3) 
Vessel vent valve 
Area (m2) 
0.1297 
0.1297 
io-3 
1.6 x 10~3 
0.51 x 10~3 
Diameter 
0.406 m 
0.406 m 
0.035 m 
0.045 m 
0.025 m/with restriction of 1 cm 
manway open and vessel vent) and proposing suitable 
changes in APs (abnormal procedures). Besides, it has been 
analyzed the impact of this proposals in the operator allow-
able times (see Table 1). 
2. Simulation of loss of RHRS sequences at midloop level 
The simulations have been performed with the TRACE 
model of Almaraz NPP, which has been described in previ-
ous papers, Queral et al. (2006b) and Gonzalez et al. 
(2007). It has been considered different availability of steam 
generators in order to analyze the capability of the reflux-
condensation as a mechanism of cooling for different con-
figurations and the allowable times for other cooling 
mechanisms. 
The initial conditions and hypothesis for the transients 
are: 
• midloop level (mass inventory of almost 73,000 kg), 
• initial pressure 1 bar, initial temperature 333.15 K, 
• 11 MW of thermal power, 
• pressurizer is connected to loop 2, 
• availability of steam generators as follows: 
- 3 steam generators full of water: 3SG, 
- 2 steam generators full of water and 1 full of air (loop 
3): 2SG, 
- 1 steam generator full of water (loop 1) and the rest 
containing air: 1SG, and 
- all steam generators full of air: OSG. 
• secondary pressure: 1 bar, and 
• no Auxiliary Feedwater available and no feed of coolant 
available. 
The main variables of this kind of transients are the time 
to boil and to core uncovery, the maximum pressure and 
the clad temperature. Table 2 shows these variables for 
the cases with 2 PORV open («SG-2P), pressurizer manway 
open (nSG-PM) and closed scenarios (nSG-C). 
In order to complete the different simulated scenarios 
(closed, 2 PORV and PMO), a sensitivity analysis with 
other different scenarios has been performed. The simu-
lated scenarios corresponding with these analysis are: 
• sensitivity to the number of open valves: loss of RHRS 
at midloop level with 1 PORV open (nSG-lP), 
• sensitivity to the valve location: loss of RHRS at mid-
loop level with the vessel valve vent open (KSG-VV) , 
• sensitivity to primary mass inventory: loss of RHRS 
with 2 PORV open and the RCS level covering the hot 
and cold legs («SG-2P-L), and 
• sensitivity to a finite closed relief tank: loss of RHRS 
with 2 PORV open and the relief tank (in dry condi-
tions) simulated («SG-2P-T). 
These results are also compared with the results 
obtained by other authors with RELAP5 models: 
• Rl : Ferng and Ma (1996). The simulation corresponds 
to 3 loop PWR-JF, 11 MW of decay heat, initial hot 
leg temperature 328 K. 
Table 2 
Simulations results for the loss of RHRS at midloop level 
Cases 
Closed 
3SG-C 
2SG-C 
1SG-C 
OSG-C 
R1-2SG-C 
R1-1SG-C 
R2-3SG-C 
R3-4SG-C 
2 PORV 
3SG-2P 
2SG-2P 
1SG-2P 
0SG-2P 
PMO 
3SG-PM 
2SG-PM 
1SG-PM 
OSG-PM 
R2-3SG-PM 
R2-0SG-PM 
R3-4SG-PM 
1 PORV 
3SG-1P 
Vessel vent 
2SG-W 
R2-3SG-W 
R2-2SG-W 
R2-1SG-W 
R2-0SG-W 
2 PORV level 
2SG-2P-L 
2 PORV and 
2SG-2P-T 
Time to 
boil (min) 
10 
10 
10 
10 
10 
10 
6 
5 
10 
10 
10 
10 
10 
10 
10 
10 
5.8 
5.8 
5 
10 
10 
6 
6 
6 
6 
covering legs 
10 
relief tank simulated 
10 
Time to 
uncovery 
no 
152 
144 
no 
no 
no 
no 
20 
250 
250 
114 
114 
80 
80 
80 
80 
61 
49 
20 
165 
>250 
no 
no 
no 
331 
>250 
(dry conditions) 
153 
Maximum 
pressure (bar) 
3.8 
5.6 
11.5 
No limit 
6.3 
3.6 
2.5 
3.1 
6 
12.4 
1.4 
1.4 
1.5 
1.6 
1 
1 
3.1 
3.7 
2.8 
3.3 
3.3 
4.9 
3.5 
5.4 
Time to 
2/3 bar 
45/85 min 
33/62 min 
33/48 min 
33/35 min 
26/46 min 
26/46 min 
83/230 min 
71 min/not 
50/137 min 
31/65 min 
27/42 min 
not 
not 
not 
not 
not 
not 
70/150 min 
50/88 min 
96 min 
80 min 
77 min 
42 min 
60/105 min 
33/66min 
Clad temperature 
at 10.000 s (K) 
414 
486 
562 
405 
410 
1020 
1020 
1265 
1383 
1412 
1744 
460 
407 
420 
485 
Time to HL 
level decrease 
Not 
60 min 
95 min 
No 
> 170 min 
60 min 
95 min 
> 170 min 
> 170 min 
60 min 
60 min 
> 170 min 
>170 
60 min 
60 min 
60 min 
• R2: Kim et al. (2000). The simulation corresponds to 3 
loop PWR- W, 11 MW of decay heat, initial hot leg tem-
perature 333 K. 
• R3: Hassan and Raja (1993). The simulation corre-
sponds to 3 loop PWR-H7, 17 MW of decay heat, initial 
hot leg temperature 333 K. 
All the sequences simulated with our model show that 
core reaches saturation in about 10 min after the loss of 
RHRS. However, lower values of time to boil, about 
6 min, are obtained by other authors with RELAP5 mod-
els. This difference could be explained considering that 
the 3D vessel model of TRACE allows to simulate the nat-
ural circulation that appears inside the core during the 
heating before boiling; the natural circulation generates a 
large thermal mixing inside the core. However, the 
RELAP5 models have a one dimensional vessel model 
which does not allow to simulate the natural circulation 
inside a core at midloop conditions. 
The pressure starts to increase, due to the steam forma-
tion, reaching an equilibrium pressure (except for the 
closed scenario and without steam generators), Fig. 2. 
The highest pressures correspond to the closed cases, and 
the lowest pressures to the pressurizer manway open 
(PMO) ones (slightly above one bar), Table 2. An interme-
diate situation corresponds to the 2PORV open cases. The 
reached RCS pressure affects considerably to the gravity 
feed effectiveness. The maximum pressure for gravity feed 
depends on the specific plant and its configuration, but this 
pressure is generally between 2 and 3 bar. The time avail-
able for the gravity feed for the open cases is considerably 
greater than in the closed scenarios, Fig. 2 and Table 2. In 
fact, in all PMO cases gravity feed is always possible. Also 
the 3SG-2P case never reaches the 3 bar limit pressure. The 
allowable time to gravity feed not only depends on the size 
of the opening, but also on the number of steam generators 
in operation. 
With regard to core uncovery, the time to reach this con-
dition is highly dependent on residual heat, mass inventory 
2e+05 
and RCS mass distribution. That is, it depends on the loss 
of mass through PORVs, the mass accumulated in the U-
tubes and the pressurizer and, finally, the mass distribution 
in the hot and cold legs. The cases with less time to core 
uncovery are the PMO cases due to large amount of inven-
tory lost through the vent and also the amount of water 
accumulated in the pressurizer, Fig. 3 and Table 3. After 
the core uncovery, the higher clad temperatures are also 
reached for the PMO scenarios, Fig. 4. 
The real plant situation with 2 PORV open and closed 
and dry relief tank corresponds to a situation that is similar 
to the simulated closed scenarios, as it is proved in the sen-
sitivity analysis, Table 2. The relief valves are connected to 
a pipe connected to the relief tank, which is generally 
drained in LPS conditions. Therefore, the results consid-
ered to be the most conservative ones are the most limita-
tive ones between both cases, the closed and the 2 PORV 
scenarios. 
In the following, the paper only considers two configu-
rations, the PMO cases and the 2 PORV cases (restricted 
to the most limited results between closed and 2 PORV sce-
narios). This assumption is due to the fact that the Spanish 
NPPs generally operate with these vent configurations. 
Regarding the sensitivity cases performed, the 2SG-2P-L 
case presents a higher time to core uncovery than 2SG-2P 
due to more mass inventory in the first case. And in the 
2SG-VV case, the inventory lost through the vent is lower 
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Time (s) 
Fig. 3. Pressurizer collapsed water level. PMO scenarios. 
Table 3 
Lost mass through vent at 10,000 s 
Cases Mass lost through vent (kg) Initial mass (%) 
4000 6000 
Time (s) 
Fig. 2. Primary pressures. 
3SG-2P 
2SG-2P 
1SG-2P 
0SG-2P 
3SG-PM 
2SG-PM 
1SG-PM 
0SG-PM 
4000 
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Fig. 4. Clad temperatures. 
than the one of the cases with other vents. These consider-
ations lead to a higher time to core uncovery, Fig. 5. As we 
have shown, the 2SG-W case corresponds to an interest-
ing scenario, because there is a path for the pressure relief 
without water accumulation in the pressurizer. 
With respect to the possibility that the plant has in-
stalled nozzle dams in the steam generators, the behavior 
of this situation could be similar to the cases with steam 
generators full of air in the secondary side (not operating) 
but with less free volume available, and as a result, the 
pressure reached in these cases could be higher. The typical 
value of the nozzle dams design pressure is about 3.5 bar. 
In this sense, only the PMO cases seem to provide enough 
certainty that this pressure is not reached any time. With 
regard to the other simulated transients, the worst case is 
0SG-C, which reaches the design pressure of the nozzle 
dams in about 40 min, in contrast with the best possible 
case with nozzle dams and 2 PORV, 2SG-2P, that reaches 
a maximum pressure of 3.1 bar, almost the design pressure, 
in about 137 min. However, it should be necessary to per-
form simulations that consider these nozzle dams in order 
to analyze its impact. 
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Fig. 5. Primary pressures. Sensitivity analysis: 2 PORV open, vessel vent 
open, closed RCS and 2 PORV with simulated relief tank. 
3. Abnormal procedures of loss of RHRS at midloop 
conditions 
During a sequence of loss of RHRS during midloop 
operation, the operator must take appropriate actions to 
keep the core cooled. These actions are included in a spe-
cific abnormal procedure. Therefore, the possible actuation 
of a particular cooling mechanism not only depends on its 
consideration in the AP, but also if it is possible according 
to the physical conditions of the plant. There are several 
kinds of AP in Westinghouse NPP, some of them are, 
NRC (1994), Ginna Station (2005): type 1, Fig. 6, type 2, 
Fig. 7 and type 3, Fig. 8. 
There are several differences between these APs: 
• In type 1 (API), the normal charge or safety injection, 
the gravity feed and reflux-condensation appear as alter-
native means of cooling after the loss of RHRS, no 
distinction of hot leg level and core outlet temperature 
are included. The RHRS recovery does not depend on 
the temperature and hot leg level. 
• In type 2 (AP2), there is a step in which the hot leg level 
is checked. If the level is lower than a particular level 
value l2, then the operator could use safety injection, 
gravity feed and reflux-condensation as mechanisms of 
cooling. However, if the hot leg level is higher than l2, 
the procedure only reflects the reflux-condensation. 
The RHRS recovery is considered only if the hot leg 
level is higher than L2. 
• In type 3 (AP3), there is an initial step in which the core 
outlet temperature is checked. If the temperature is 
higher than the boiling temperature at atmospheric pres-
sure, then safety injection could be possible. But, if this 
temperature is lower than the boiling temperature, then 
the hot leg level is also checked. Once the level is 
checked, three situations can take place. If the level is 
higher than L2, there is not cooling mechanism consid-
ered. In opposition, if the level is between L2 and 
another reference level l\, then the operator could use 
normal charge, and gravity feed. Finally, if the level is 
lower than Lu the safety injection is considered. After 
these processes, the reflux-cooling is also considered in 
the procedure. The RHRS recovery is only possible if 
the hot leg level is higher than L2 and the core outlet 
temperature is lower than a particular temperature T0 
(lower than atmospheric boiling temperature). 
According to the simulations results, Table 2, it is 
important to highlight the following considerations: 
• In API, there is not evaluation of the hot leg level and 
temperature, and therefore, all the cooling mechanisms 
could be possible whenever the plant conditions allow 
it. The gravity feed will be possible when the pressure 
is below the limit for the RWST. 
• In AP2, there is an evaluation of the hot leg level and 
therefore all the cooling mechanisms could not always 
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Fig. 6. Scheme of the procedure after a of loss of RHRS. Type 1 (Queral et al., 2006b). 
be possible. It will depends on both, the plant condi-
tions and if the AP allow it according to the hot leg 
level measurement. The gravity feed and the safety 
injection only will be possible when the hot leg level 
decrease from midloop level. The simulation results, 
Table 2, show that the hot level only decreases below 
midloop in 2SG and ISG cases, but the gravity feed 
will be only possible when the pressure is below the 
limit for the RWST. 
It must be taken into account that hot leg level mea-
sure depends on which hot leg the level is measured 
due to the possibility of having different levels in dif-
ferent hot legs. Only if the level measure in the hot 
leg with decreasing level is performed, the safety injec-
tion and the gravity feed could be possible. In general, 
the hot leg level is measured in the hot legs without 
connection with the pressurizer. 
• In AP3, as in the AP2, the action of the cooling mecha-
nism depends on the plant conditions and if the AP 
allows it according to, first the core outlet temperature 
and second the hot leg level measurement. 
In this AP gravity feed is not possible because before 
reaching the boiling temperature (10 min) the hot leg 
level does not decrease in any case. 
Taking into account these considerations, Tables 4 and 5 
show the available times for the cooling mechanisms. The 
allowable times for the 2 PORV open real cases correspond 
to the most conservative between the simulated 2 PORV 
open cases and the simulated closed ones as it is reflected 
in Table 4. These allowable times depends on both, the 
physical plant conditions and the abnormal procedure: 
• core uncovery: CU, 
• primary pressure: PP, 
• the abnormal procedure in the step in which the hot leg 
level is evaluated: AP-L (AP2), and 
• the abnormal procedure in the step in which the temper-
ature is evaluated: AP-T (AP3). 
In some cases, such as in AP2, 2SG and ISG, the allow-
able times are limited by the measure of the hot leg level 
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(the gravity feed and safety injection only could be possible 
if the hot leg level decrease from midloop), by the time to 
core uncovery for the safety injection and by the time to 
reach the limit pressure for the gravity feed. 
4. Event tree for the loss of RHRS at midloop conditions 
In PRA (probabilistic risk analysis), the events delinea-
tion is performed by means of event trees. The headers of 
the event tree must consider not only the physical limita-
tions, but also the abnormal procedures. Therefore, the 
relationship between the event tree and the AP should be 
a close one. 
Firstly, only the cooling mechanisms which are consid-
ered in the AP could be considered as a header in the event 
tree. Secondly, it must be checked if during the sequence 
simulations the necessary conditions to consider these 
mechanism are fulfilled. Meaning that, if some cooling 
Table 4 
Available time for each cooling mechanism 
AP 
API 
3SG 
2SG 
1SG 
OSG 
AP2 
3SG 
2SG 
1SG 
OSG 
AP3 
3SG 
2SG 
1SG 
OSG 
Recovery 
RHRS 
0-250 min (CU) 
0-152 min(CU) 
0-114 min (CU) 
>170min(CU) 
0-250 min (CU) 
0-60 min (AP-L) 
0-95 min (AP-L) 
>170min(CU) 
0-10 min (AP-T) 
0-10 min (AP-T) 
0-10 min (AP-T) 
0-10 min (AP-T) 
Injection 
0-250 min (CU) 
0-152 min (CU) 
0-114 min (CU) 
>170min(CU) 
No (AP-L) 
60-152 min (AP-L; 
95-144 min (AP-L; 
No (AP-L) 
10-250 min (AP-T; 
10-152 min (AP-T; 
10-114 min (AP-T; 
10-114 min (AP-T; 
CU) 
CU) 
CU) 
CU) 
CU) 
CU) 
Gravity feed 
(2/3bar) 
0-45/85 min (PP) 
0-33/62 min (PP) 
0-31/48 min (PP) 
0-27/35 min (PP) 
No (AP-L) 
No (AP-L; PP) 
No (AP-L; PP) 
No (AP-L) 
No (AP-T) 
No (AP-T) 
No (AP-T) 
No (AP-T) 
2 PORV. 
Table 5 
Available time for each cooling mechanism 
AP Recovery 
RHRS 
Injection Gravity feed 
API 
3SG 
2SG 
1SG 
OSG 
0-80 min (CU) 
0-80 min (CU) 
0-80 min (CU) 
0-80 min (CU) 
0-80 min (CU) 
0-80 min (CU) 
0-80 min (CU) 
0-80 min (CU) 
0-80 min (CU) 
0-80 min (CU) 
0-80 min (CU) 
0-80 min (CU) 
AP2 
3SG 0-80 min (CU) No (AP-L) No (AP-L) 
2SG 0-60 min (AP-L) 60-80 min (AP-L; CU) 60-80 min (AP-L; CU) 
1SG 0-80 min (CU) 60-80 min (AP-L; CU) 60-80 min (AP-L; CU) 
OSG 0-80 min (CU) No (AP-L) No (AP-L) 
AP3 
3SG 
2SG 
1SG 
OSG 
0-10 min (AP-T) 
0-10 min (AP-T) 
0-10 min (AP-T) 
0-10 min (AP-T) 
10-80 min (AP-T; CU) 
10-80 min (AP-T; CU) 
10-80 min (AP-T; CU) 
10-80 min (AP-T; CU) 
No (AP-T) 
No (AP-T) 
No (AP-T) 
No (AP-T) 
PMO. 
mechanism are not possible according to the AP and the 
sequences simulation, this mechanism should not be 
included as a event tree header. 
The headers included in the event tree corresponding to 
the different AP considered in the previous section are: 
• RHR: operation of the other train of RHR, 
• VENT: existence of a vent, 
• HPIS: recovery of inventory with charging pumps, 
• GRAV: gravity feed from RWST, 
• R-C: reflux-condensation, and 
• RECIRC: long term cooling. 
According to the simulations results, the order of the 
headers depends on the associated AP. Moreover, the 
order of both first headers, RHR and VENT, does not 
vary. However, the order of headers HPIS, GRAV and 
R-C is not the same, it depends on the associated abnor-
mal procedure. With the associated API, the order of the 
headers is HPIS, GRAV and R-C. With AP2, the order 
is R-C, HPIS and GRAV. With AP3 the order is HPIS 
and R-C (GRAV seems to be not possible). Finally, the 
last header, RECIRC, is included in the event tree for all 
AP. The event tree that considers all the AP is shown in 
Fig. 9. 
The header's description is included in the following 
paragraphs: 
RHR Operation of the second train of RHRS. 
This header considers the possibility to startup the 
other train of RHRS. For each event tree there are 
the following considerations: 
API The API procedure always allows to try the 
start up of the other train of RHRS. Therefore, 
the allowable time for this header is the time to 
core uncovery. It must be taken into account 
that it is not advisable the start up the RHRS 
without enough level in the hot legs. 
AP2 The AP2 procedure allows to start up the 
RHRS if there is enough level in hot legs 
(approximately midloop). Therefore, the allow-
able time to start up of the RHRS depends on 
the number of SG operating, in which hot leg 
the level is measured and the time to core 
uncovery. 
AP3 The AP3 procedure allows to start up the other 
train of RHRS with enough level in hot leg and 
with a temperature lower than the boiling tem-
perature. Therefore, the allowable time for this 
header is about 10 min. 
VENT Existence of a vent path. 
This header takes into account the possibility of the 
primary system opening. In open scenarios there is 
not R-C header due to the fact that this mechanism 
does not lead to long term cooldown. 
HPIS Recovery of inventory with charging pumps. 
In those situations in which the train of RHRS can 
not be started, the operator can feed the RCS by nor-
mal charge or safety injection. There are the follow-
ing considerations: 
API The API procedure always allows this mecha-
nism and therefore the allowable time is the 
time to core uncovery. 
AP2 The AP2 procedure allows the injection if the 
hot leg level is below L2 (approximately mid-
loop) and as result this header is later consid-
ered than R-C header. In this case the 
allowable time is conditioned to the time in 
which the hot leg level decrease from midloop 
and the time to core uncovery. 
AP3 The AP3 procedure considers the injection after 
the boiling and before the boiling if the hot leg 
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Fig. 9. Event tree for the loss of RHRS at midloop conditions. 
level is lower than L\. The last one conditions 
are not achieve in any case. Therefore, the 
allowable time for this header is from the boil-
ing to the core uncovery. 
GRAV Gravity feed from RWST. 
In practice, the last option to feed the RCS is the 
gravity feed. In general, the efficiency of this cooling 
mechanism highly depends on the primary pressure, 
not assuring the success of the cooling mechanism 
below the limit pressure. There are the following 
considerations: 
API According to API, the gravity feed is always 
possible, only it is limited by the primary pres-
sure (time to 2/3 bar) or the time to core 
uncovery. 
AP2 The AP2 procedure allows the gravity feed if 
the hot leg level is lower than a particular 
level L2. Taking into account this issue, and 
the time to reach the limit pressure, it seems 
that gravity feed is only possible for the cases 
2SG-PM and 1SG-PM because the pressure 
keeps being low when the hot leg level 
decreases from midloop. 
AP3 The AP3 only considers the gravity feed 
before reaching the boiling temperature and 
with a hot leg level lower than L2. However, 
there are not cases that fulfill these conditions 
and, therefore, in ET3 there is no header cor-
responding to gravity feed. 
5. Proposed modifications in the abnormal procedures. 
Impact on the event tree 
In this section, the abnormal procedures AP2 and 
AP3 have been modified in order to consider the safety 
injection and the gravity feed in the conditions in 
which they were not allowed, it is said, these procedures 
are modified in order to have the cooling mechanism 
only limited by physical conditions, and not by the 
procedure. 
In AP2, after a period of time t0, in which the hot leg 
level does not decrease from midloop but the loss of RHRS 
continues, it is convenient to include safety injection and 
gravity feed, Fig. 10. This period of time, much earlier than 
core uncovery (see Table 2), depends on the size of the vent 
and it could be the following: 
• In PMO cases: t0 should be less than 60 min (earlier than 
core uncovery that amounts 80 min) for safety injection 
and gravity feed. 
• In 2 PORV cases: t0 should be less than 20 min for grav-
ity feed (earlier than limit time for gravity feed, which 
worse case is 27 min). However for safety injection 
90 min could be enough (earlier than core uncovery that 
amounts 114 min). 
In AP3, after reaching the boiling temperature, the pro-
cedure does not consider the gravity feed if the safety injec-
tion fails (in case of Station Black Out, like Vogtle event, 
NRC, 1990). However, with large vents this mechanism 
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Fig. 10. Modification of the abnormal procedure AP2. AP2M. 
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Fig. 11. Modification of the abnormal procedure AP3. AP3M. 
could be an effective one and could avoid the core uncov- tied procedure, Fig. 11. The allowable time for each 
ery. Therefore, the gravity feed is considered in this modi- mechanism is conditioned to the time to core uncovery. 
Table 6 
Allowable time for the HPIS header 
Case 
3SG 
2SG 
1SG 
OSG 
Modified AP2. 
Table 7 
2 PORV-O 
No (AP-L) 
60-152 min(AP-L; 
95-114 min (AP-L; 
No (AP-L) 
Allowable time for the GRAV header 
Case 
AP2 
3SG 
2SG 
1SG 
OSG 
AP3 
3SG 
2SG 
1SG 
OSG 
2PORV-0 
No (AP-L) 
No (AP-L; PP) 
No (AP-L; PP) 
No (AP-L) 
No (AP-T) 
No (AP-T) 
No (AP-T) 
No (AP-T) 
CU) 
CU) 
2 PORV-M 
250 min (CU) 
152min(CU) 
114 min (CU) 
114 min (CU) 
2PORV-M 
45/85 min (PP) 
33/62 min (PP) 
31/48 min (PP) 
27/3 5 min (PP) 
45/85 min (PP) 
33/62 min (PP) 
31/48 min (PP) 
27/3 5 min (PP) 
PMO-O 
No (AP-L) 
60-80 min (AP-L; CU) 
60-80 min (AP-L; CU) 
No (AP-L) 
PMO-O 
No (AP-L) 
60-80 min (AP-L; CU) 
60-80 min (AP-L; CU) 
No (AP-L) 
No (AP-T) 
No (AP-T) 
No (AP-T) 
No (AP-T) 
PMO-M 
80min(CU) 
80min(CU) 
80min(CU) 
80min(CU) 
PMO-M 
80min(CU) 
80min(CU) 
80min(CU) 
80min(CU) 
80min(CU) 
80min(CU) 
80min(CU) 
80min(CU) 
Modified AP2 and AP3. 
Other modifications that might be included are relative 
to the opening or closing the RCS vents according to the 
plant conditions: 
RCS closed 
To open pressurizer PORVs and vessel vent valve (like 
in Korean procedures (Kim et al., 2000)) in order to 
extend the allowable time for gravity feed. If the pres-
sure continues increasing and the gravity feed is not pos-
sible, it is better to close again the primary system for 
enhancing the reflux cooling and limiting the loss of 
mass inventory. 
If there are installed any nozzle dams, it is not appro-
priate to close the RCS in order to protect their 
integrity. 
PMO 
To close pressurizer manway in order to take advantage 
of reflux cooling and limiting the loss of mass inventory 
(like in some Spanish procedures). This consideration 
could only be done after new fuel reload because, in 
these conditions there is enough time to close the pres-
surizer manway before boiling (about 30 min). 
2 PORV open 
• With closed relief tank (dry). 
Open vessel vent valve (the remaining procedure like in 
RCS closed case). 
• With open relief tank. 
This configuration is not used in general in power 
plants, but it could be interesting to analyze this config-
uration because it allows a higher vent than in the pre-
vious case and it could be closed quickly. 
In order to develop procedures that consider all the pos-
sible cooling mechanism, the existing procedures have been 
modified. As a result of these modifications, the allowable 
time for each header have also increased. An important 
improvement is observed (original: case-0 and modified: 
case-M), mainly in the GRAV header that now becomes 
possible, Tables 6 and 7. 
6. Conclusions 
The main conclusions of this analysis are 
• A midloop model of Almaraz NPP with TRACE code 
has been performed, which shows a good behavior in 
the simulation of this kind of sequences. This model 
has allowed us to analyze the capability of the 
reflux-condensation mechanism and to understand 
the physical phenomena involved in this kind of 
transients. 
• The simulation results show that the main parameters 
depends on primary vent and the number of steam gen-
erators available. In order to obtain allowable times 
large enough with respect to gravity feed and core 
uncovery it is convenient to have at least two steam gen-
erators available. Among possible vents, it seems that 
vessel vent is quite appropriate because it is a good path 
vent for relieving pressure with a small inventory loss. 
• The application of the results to the analysis of abnor-
mal procedures with different configurations (steam gen-
erators and vent paths available) shows that the 
utilization of a cooling mechanism not only depends 
on physical conditions of the plant, but also on the 
abnormal procedure. It is observed that not always the 
safety injection and gravity feed are possible according 
with the current abnormal procedure. This consider-
ation must be taken into account in the event tree. 
• In this paper, two kinds of abnormal procedures have 
been modified in order to consider the safety injection 
and gravity feed in the conditions in which they were 
not allowed by current abnormal procedure but, accord-
ing with the plant configuration it could be beneficial to 
be considered. In this sense, the impact of the abnormal 
procedure modifications in the headers of the event tree 
is also analyzed. These modifications lead to a consider-
able improvement of the allowable times of the event 
tree headers. 
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